




The British1 railway network was privatised in a pro-
cess that began over 10 years ago.This paper reviews
the process of privatisation and the changes that the
railway has undergone and the changing level of
state involvement and regulation.
One of the main intentions of privatisation of the
network was to create a liberalised structure in
which private companies could provide railway ser-
vices to passengers and freight users, with minimal
involvement from the state other than its role in
specifying and funding socially desirable services. It
was expected that this would lead to increased effi-
ciency and responsiveness to changes in market de-
mands. However, since the initial structure was put
in place, there has been further change for the in-
dustry, culminating in a Government review pub-
lished in 2004 and new legislation in 2005.
Throughout these changes, one constant factor has
been the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR),2 the inde-
pendent economic regulator for the rail industry.
ORR was created by the same legislation3 that al-
lowed British Rail (BR), the publicly-owned compa-
ny that previously ran the British railway system, to
be broken up and sold off. ORR’s principal respon-
sibility was and still is the regulation of the monopoly
and dominant elements of the railway with particular
focus on the main rail network infrastructure manag-
er, Network Rail.4
ORR has had to do this against a background of
changing Government priorities and industry struc-
tures, while maintaining our independence in seek-
ing to promote the public interest as set out in our
statutory duties. So ORR acts in a sense like a refer-
ee in a game of football, to ensure that all the play-
ers play fairly and stick to the rules.However,unlike
a game of football, ORR is also able to modify the
rules, and we also seek to encourage effective rela-
tionships between the different companies operating
in the sector to ensure that the needs of rail users are
met in a way which offers best value for money.
Background
The railways in Britain were originally built mostly
without state involvement. Much of the nineteenth
century infrastructure, particularly structures, is still
recognisable today. Private companies built their
own networks, often in direct competition with their
rivals,on the basis of private Acts of Parliament.The
result was a railway that was not centrally planned,
but developed where companies thought that there
might be a profitable market. Each major company
built its own track, operated its own passenger and
freight services and designed and built its own
rolling stock (often to unique company standards).
The state took control of the railways during the
First and Second World Wars, and promoted a reor-
ganisation in 1923 in which most railway operations
were merged into four vertically integrated regional
companies. The railways were nationalised in 1948,
when BR was formed.
BR was never profitable and received annual Gov-
ernment subsidy despite internal efficiency savings and
the sale of non-core activities (such as hotels). In the
1960s and 1970s, the size of the network was reduced
by about a third.This contributed to reduced costs,but
the network still required state funding, and the
Government was forced on several occasions to write
off debt. Measures designed to focus subsidy on spe-
cific services, for example in the 1968 Transport Act,
were also ultimately unsuccessful in creating a more
commercial environment and improved efficiency.
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1 This paper covers the situation in Great Britain, excluding
Northern Ireland.
2 Initially known as the Office of the Rail Regulator; it was re-
named when a Board structure was introduced in July 2004.
3 1993 Railways Act – since amended by the Transport Act 2000,
Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 and Railways Act 2005.
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In 1992, the Conservative Government manifesto
declared its intention to privatise BR.The aim was to
reduce State involvement in the railway, reduce the
burden on taxpayers and bring in private sector
funding and expertise. The railways were the last of
the major privatisations which had started with the
privatisation of British Telecom in 1984, and contin-
ued with privatisation of the gas, water and electrici-
ty networks.
Privatisation and regulation of the railway
As well as the last, the railways were the most com-
plex and most politically divisive. Unlike the other
companies that had been privatised, BR was depen-
dent on Government subsidy to operate and was ex-
pected to remain so when in the private sector. The
privatisation also involved the biggest restructuring,
with one integrated company being replaced by over
100 separate companies,held together through a com-
plex set of contractual relationships, many requiring
the approval of ORR and by licences enforced (and
where appropriate modified) by ORR.
Three models of privatisation had been considered
before deciding on this approach.
The first was to sell off the whole company as a sin-
gle entity,with no rail competitors (though of course
rail is in competition with other modes of transport).
This model had been used for the sale of British Gas,
but was criticised for moving a monopoly from the
public to the private sector, and not introducing real
competition.In the case of British Gas,the result was
a decade of confrontation with its regulator, leading
to numerous references to the Competition Com-
mission,5 the introduction of domestic competition
and the demerger into three successor companies
covering gas exploration, transmission and distribu-
tion, and gas supply.
The second model was to break BR into several re-
gional companies, in some ways replicating the situa-
tion before the railway was nationalised in the 1940s.
This is essentially the structure that still exists in the
privatised water industry in England and Wales.This
model, which was also used for the privatisation of
Japan Railways, was rejected for creating regional
monopolies and not introducing competition.
The third option, the one that was adopted, was the
“Track Authority” model. BR was vertically separat-
ed, with a new private company, “Railtrack”, owning
the infrastructure and charging train operators to
have access to the network. Although there was ini-
tially a view that Railtrack might be retained as a pub-
lic sector company, it was floated on the stock market
in 1996.The track and infrastructure maintenance ac-
tivities of BR were divided into several companies
and also sold off, mostly to construction companies,
with contracts to supply services to Railtrack. In par-
allel, franchises to run passenger services for periods
of between 5 and 15 years were also tendered by a
public sector body, the Office of Passenger Rail Fran-
chising (OPRAF).Some of these franchises were awar-
ded to management teams, but many were awarded to
bus companies.
Railtrack was a monopoly and, as with other priva-
tised infrastructure companies,the privatisation leg-
islation created an independent economic regulator
to ensure that it did not abuse its monopoly posi-
tion.ORR was given the role of regulating the com-
pany through enforcing conditions set out in the li-
cence the company was required to have to operate
the network.
As part of its regulation of Railtrack,ORR also need-
ed to establish the charging framework that deter-
mined the track access fees that the company could
set.The charging framework would allow Railtrack to
recoup its efficient costs as well as providing a return
on its capital.The framework of track access charges
is generally fixed for a five-year period, after which it
was to be reviewed by the regulator. Following the
initial establishment of the charging framework in
1995,a periodic review took place in 2000,with a spe-
cial interim review taking effect in 2004.The next pe-
riodic review of charges will take effect in 2009.
ORR also has a role in ensuring that the network is
being operated effectively and fairly in approving
all track access contracts. In addition, it has concur-
rent competition powers for railway services with
the Office of Fair Trading (the national competition
authority).
At the time of privatisation, there was considerable
debate about the appropriate extent of competition
between train operators. To be eligible for subsidy,
passenger services have to be operated under a fran-
chise agreement. There were initially 25 franchises,
with franchises being awarded to operators that of- 5 Previously the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.fered the best value,generally in terms of  the lowest
level of subsidy (or in a few cases the highest premi-
um). Except where franchises overlapped (with, for
example, services from London to Birmingham be-
ing provided by three different operators), there
were initially restrictions on the ability of so-called
“open access” operators to seek access rights to run
competing services.To date, there has been only one
open access operation of any size, which runs ser-
vices without subsidy from Hull to London (a route
not served well by the relevant franchise).
In contrast, there has been competition in the provi-
sion of rail freight services from the start.The freight
division of BR was sold off as six separate compa-
nies, with the individual companies free to negotiate
access with Railtrack. Although in the event five of
these companies were acquired by the same owner,
other operators have since entered the freight mar-
ket and have been successful in winning business
from other freight operators, as well as bringing new
business to rail.
Although Railtrack and all train operators require a
licence to provide services, other companies spun
out of BR generally do not.These included the com-
panies providing maintenance and renewal services
to Railtrack, and the Rolling Stock Companies
(ROSCOs), created to own all rolling stock and fi-
nance new rolling stock, and lease it to train opera-
tors. Three ROSCOs were created at privatisation,
and their activities are “regulated” only through
general competition law.
Restructuring of the industry 
The first years of the railways in the private sector
were generally positive. Passenger numbers grew, as
did the amount of freight carried. Additional ser-
vices were introduced on the network. New passen-
ger freight and freight rolling stock were also intro-
duced.Passenger-kilometres have increased by 35 per-
cent from 1994–2004 and freight tonne-kilometres in-
creased by 40 percent over the same period.
Railtrack’s initial performance as a private sector
company also appeared to be positive. However, a se-
ries of events began to undermine confidence in the
company. The company embarked on a major devel-
opment of the West Coast main line, the key strate-
gic route to Scotland from London via Birmingham,
Liverpool and Manchester. The development of that
route was intended to renew and upgrade the infra-
structure, resulting in faster journey times, improved
reliability and increased capacity. The initial project
was very ambitious,and the target improvements were
delayed and were subject to significant cost overruns.
Although passenger numbers grew, the franchises
were also not without problems.Some of the earliest
franchise bidders found that they were unrealistic in
their projections. Several franchise operators sought
to renegotiate their franchise agreements, and some
were allowed additional subsidy.
A major feature of the British rail network in the ten
years since privatisation has been the increase in
costs.The rise in costs has been attributed to several
factors, including higher safety standards, new leg-
islative requirements for example in respect of ac-
cessibility of trains and stations, growing risk aver-
sion, and poor cost control and asset knowledge on
Railtrack’s part. This was in some part due to the
way in which maintenance was contracted out,which
resulted in a loss of control by Railtrack of key in-
formation on its assets.ORR recognised this last fail-
ing and strengthened the company’s licence; howev-
er, Network Rail decided in 2004 that maintenance
should be brought back in-house, and this transition
has now been completed.
Public confidence was eroded in the railways in gen-
eral and Railtrack in particular by a series of fatal ac-
cidents between 1997 and 2000. Following a fatal ac-
cident in 2000 at Hatfield, north of London, a large
number of speed restrictions were placed on the net-
work. Performance suffered dramatically, costs esca-
lated and Railtrack’s share price fell.This culminated
in 2001 when Railtrack was placed into Railway
Administration and was ultimately acquired by Net-
work Rail, a company limited by guarantee, owned
by about 115 “members”rather than by shareholders.
Before this, the change of Government in 1997 had
led to a review of the structure and regulation of the
railway industry. The new Government concluded
that the public sector structure that it inherited was
not fit for the purpose. It created an agency to plan
the long-term future of the railway, the “Strategic
Rail Authority” (SRA), which took on the franchise
award and monitoring functions of OPRAF.The cre-
ation of the SRA was an acknowledgment by the
Government of the need for a longer term strategy,
while retaining the structure of private sector provi-
sion put in place at the time of privatisation.
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In 2004 the Government announced a further Rail
Review, prompted by concerns about the deteriora-
tion in performance and escalation in costs since the
Hatfield accident and reflecting the other changes in
the industry, including the replacement of Railtrack
by Network Rail. In the conclusions to the review,
published in July 2004, the Government decided to
change again the responsibility for rail strategy,
bringing this back within central government. As a
consequence, the SRA was wound up and its fran-
chising functions were also brought inside the De-
partment for Transport. Network Rail was given ad-
ditional responsibility for the overall operation and
performance of the railways,as well as responsibility
for developing Route Utilisation Strategies – medi-
um term plans for each part of the network reflect-
ing increasing demands and the steps needed to
meet that demand while maintaining and improving
performance. ORR modified Network Rail’s licence
in 2005 to ensure that it carried out these new re-
sponsibilities effectively.
The review confirmed the Government view that in-
dependent economic regulation of the industry was
essential – a view shared by the majority of the rail
industry.The review also concluded that safety regu-
lation of the railways should transfer to ORR from
the Health and Safety Executive. Her Majesty’s Rail
Inspectorate will therefore transfer to ORR in the
early part of 2006,so that ORR becomes a combined
safety and economic regulator.
The aim of these changes is essentially two-fold,which
is recognised in the description of the railway as a
“public and private partnership”, involving “public
specification and private delivery”.The new arrange-
ments reinforce the responsibility of Network Rail
and train operators to work together to deliver im-
proved performance and efficiency in a way which
meets the requirements of rail users. But they also
place a clear responsibility on Ministers – a responsi-
bility now reflected in the Railways Act 2005 – to set
out a “High Level Output Specification” of the rail
services it wishes to fund, and the funding available,
as an input to ORR’s periodic review of Network
Rail’s outputs and allowed revenue.
The role of ORR 
The review therefore confirmed the continuation of a
“triangular relationship” between the Government,
Network Rail and the franchised train operators with
ORR playing a key role in ensuring that these rela-
tionships operate effectively and fairly.
The relationship between Network Rail and the
train operators is set out in access contracts.ORR re-
views and approves these contracts as well as any
changes to the Network Code, the industry wide
agreement that is part of each access contract that
ensures that the interests of all parties are taken in-
to account in the daily operation of the railway.The
access contracts also set out the details of the per-
formance regime. The performance regime is the
part of the access contract that penalises poor per-
formance with financial penalties. If a service is de-
layed due to a failure of the infrastructure, then the
infrastructure manager compensates the operators
that are affected. The same is also true of delays
caused by other operators.
The relationship between the Government and Net-
work Rail is another key feature of the railways and
is described in the review conclusions as a “binding
arrangement” to ensure that Government gets value
for the public money it is putting into the railway.
But this is not a contractual relationship. As ex-
plained above, the Government determines what
level of support it will give to the railway and what
its priorities for service delivery are.The outputs the
Government wants are set at a high level and will in
future take account of the Route Utilisation Strate-
gies developed by Network Rail. Detailed delivery
plans are then established for Network Rail through
its regulatory framework monitored and enforced by
ORR and by the franchised passenger operators
through franchise agreements.
The third leg, between the government and the fran-
chised passenger train operators, is the one where
ORR has the least direct involvement,but still plays an
important role. This relationship is determined by the
franchise agreement which sets out the service levels
required from each operator and the level of subsidy
(or return to the government) that each franchise re-
quire.Each train operator also has a licence granted by
ORR and subject to a set of conditions. ORR also en-
sures that the needs of other users of the railway,espe-
cially freight, are not ignored. ORR achieves this by
approving all access agreements to the network and
determining the framework for access charges.As part
of this role, ORR has reviewed the format of access
agreements and also encouraged the industry to review
the multi-lateral arrangements in the Network Code to
ensure that responsibilities of train operators and ofNetwork Rail are clear and that all companies involved
in providing services to rail users can work together to
deliver improved performance and efficiency. These
changes have continued following the rail review, for
example with a move towards integrating Network
Rail and train operator control rooms, to allow more
effective real-time management of train services.
Taken overall,the changes in the structure and regula-
tion of the rail industry in Britain anticipated much of
the EU legislation that aims to reform and revitalise
the railways.For example,rail privatisation introduced
the vertical separation of the railway industry (though
EU provisions do not require privatisation), the en-
couragement of new entrants into the market, the li-
censing of railway undertakings and the creation of an
independent regulator to act as appeal body.These re-
gulatory bodies have now been created in each mem-
ber state that has a railway and are cooperating with
each other to ensure that international, as well as do-
mestic, rail services are operated in an environment
that is fair and open.In Britain the new European leg-
islation extends our powers to previously unregulated
facilities, such as the Channel Tunnel Rail Link.
Conclusion
The privatisation of BR transferred the ownership of
the railways from the public to the private sector.At
the same time the government created a regulatory
structure that would ensure that the railways ful-
filled the various public obligations that were re-
quired of it. The initial structure has been amended
several times since privatisation to ensure that it is fit
for purpose. In particular, it is important that differ-
ent companies operating in a network industry work
together to deliver the performance and efficiency
that customers rightly demand. This requires an ap-
propriate set of contracts and licences, and effective
partnership, as now exists in Great Britain.
Our vision is for the mainline railway industry in
Britain to be one in which Network Rail, train and
freight operating companies in partnership with pub-
lic sector funders, and the railway supply industry,
work together to meet the current and future needs
and reasonable expectations of passengers and users
by providing safe,high performance,well maintained
and efficient railway services that offer value for
money for passengers, other users and funding or-
ganisations. That vision underpins our approach as
the independent economic – and in future also the
safety – regulator for the railway.
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